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Abstract 
We put forward a new, ‘coherentist’ account of quantum 
entanglement, according to which entangled systems are 
characterized by symmetric relations of ontological dependence 
among the component particles. We compare this coherentist 
viewpoint with the two most popular alternatives currently on offer—
structuralism and holism—and argue that it is essentially different 
from, and preferable to, both. In the course of this article, we point out 
how coherentism might be extended beyond the case of entanglement 
and further articulated.  
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1 Introduction 
We put forward a novel account of quantum entangled systems that 
departs substantially from those in the current literature. This 
account, we claim, makes sense of some important ideas that 
underpin extant ontological views of the quantum domain, while at 
the same time steering clear of some problematic commitments 
entailed by these views. In particular, the view that we present has it 
that entanglement should be understood in terms of the existence of 
symmetric non-mereological dependence relations, giving rise to 
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what we will call ‘coherentist’ metaphysical structures analogous to 
the interconnected 'webs of beliefs' invoked by coherentist 
epistemologists. This entails a departure from a widespread view 
according to which nature comes structured in a hierarchy of vertical 
‘levels’ ordered by dependence relations, and in which the nature of 
the ‘more fundamental’ determines the nature of the ‘less 
fundamental’. Such hierarchical assumption is not abandoned by 
recent ‘revisionary’ attempts to interpret the evidence coming from 
the quantum domain. In particular, it is not abandoned by 
structuralists, who typically claim that reality is constituted by a 
vertically ordered sequence of physical relations that do not to 
depend on, and are instead more fundamental than (or at least as 
fundamental as) physical objects. Nor is it abandoned by holists of 
the monist variety, who claim that composite physical systems are 
such that the whole is ontologically prior to its parts. Dropping the 
hierarchy assumption, however, is both possible (in spite of a 
widespread contrary opinion, symmetric dependence relations entail 
no inconsistency) and, we claim, advisable. The plan of the article is 
as follows: In Sections 2–5, we argue that genuine entanglement 
gives rise to relations of ontological dependence, and critically 
assess the two main alternatives put forward in the recent literature 
in order to account for such relations: structuralism and holism. In 
Section 6, we put forward the coherentist account and discuss (some 
of) its theoretical virtues. A brief conclusion follows in Section 7. 
 
2 Quantum Dependence 
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3 
2.1 From entanglement to dependence 
Recently, a fairly widespread agreement has emerged on the fact 
that entanglement involves relations of dependence (see Esfeld and 
Lam [2011]; French [2010]; Schaffer [2010]; Wolff [2012]; McKenzie 
[2014]; Ismael and Schaffer [forthcoming]). Consider a paradigmatic 
example of entanglement, the singlet state: 
 
1 2 1 2|  | | | |ψ 〉 = ↑〉 ↓〉 − ↓〉 ↑〉 .
1 (1) 
 
As is well known, states like Equation (1) support considerations 
such as: ‘if we measure spin up for the first particle we will 
necessarily measure spin down for the second’,2 or ‘if we had 
measured spin down for the first particle we would have obtained 
spin up for the second’. Both claims involve a modal element. Thus, 
entanglement can be said to correspond to certain modal 
connections holding between the entangled parts. Through the 
application of a weak, but plausible, variant of Hume’s dictum (see 
Wilson [2010]), according to which there are no modal connections 
between independent entities, one obtains that the systems in 
question are not independent. It is the precise features of such 
dependence that we want to explore further in what follows.  
An important remark is in order before continuing: a crucial 
distinction must be drawn between entanglement that arises purely 
                                                            
1
 We will always neglect normalization constants for simplicity.  
2
 See (Ismael and Schaffer [forthcoming], Section 3.2). The necessity involved 
in the claim is, arguably, nomological necessity.  
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because of the anti-symmetrization of a state of many particles of the 
same type, and genuine entanglement, not reducible to the previous 
type. This distinction originates from (Ghirardi et al. [2002]), and is 
adopted in (Ladyman et al. [2013]).3 To appreciate the distinction, 
consider a two-particle system in the state described in Equation (2): 
 
|↑>1|↓>2.
4 (2) 
 
Equation (2) does not capture all the degrees of freedom of the two 
particles. Let us then include another degree of freedom, the spatial 
degree of freedom, assuming that there are only two possible 
locations for particles 1 and 2, represented by |x1> and |x2>, 
respectively. Suppose we get Equation (3): 
 
|x1>1|↑>1|x2>2|↓>2.  (3) 
 
The state described in Equation (3) is not anti-symmetrized. Anti-
symmetrization yields: 
 
|x1>1|↑>1|x2>2|↓>2 - |x2>1|↓>1|x1>2|↑>2.  (4) 
 
As a matter of fact, Equation (4) cannot be written as a factorizable 
state. Thus, one may conclude, it is an entangled state. The problem 
                                                            
3
 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us on this crucial issue.  
4
 Our presentation follows closely (Ladyman et al. [2013], pp. 216–7). For more 
details, the interested reader is referred to the original publication, and to the more 
comprehensive (Ghirardi et al. [2002]).  
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5 
is that given that we started out from the state described in Equation 
(2) we do not expect any significant correlations between the spin of 
the two particles, hence no modal connections between them. And in 
fact, this is exactly what happens. The spin-probability distribution 
factorizes (Ladyman et al. [2013], p. 217). Thus, we should ensure 
that the state described in Equation (4) does not count as entangled 
in the relevant sense.5 This is achieved by maintaining that a system 
is genuinely entangled if and only if it gives rise to non-local 
correlations that violate some form of Bell-inequality.6 Ghirardi et al. 
([2002], p. 61) propose a (provably equivalent) definition: a system is 
entangled if and only if it is not the case that the reduced density 
operator of each subsystem is a projection operator onto a one-
dimensional manifold. This entails that one or more of the 
subsystems cannot be associated to a unique, well-defined state 
vector, and be consequently regarded as possessing a complete set 
of objective properties of its own. 
Let us then call the entanglement that merely arises from anti-
symmetrization but does not give raise to non-local correlation ‘non-
GMW entanglement’. Accordingly, let us call ‘GMW entanglement’ 
the entanglement that does give rise to non-local correlations 
violating some form of Bell inequality. It should be clear that GMW-
entanglement is the truly interesting form of entanglement and the 
                                                            
5
 That does not mean that this sort of entanglement is devoid of any physical 
meaning, just not the one we are after; see (Ladyman et al. [2013], pp. 217–8).  
6
 Given an aptly defined quotient space on the tensor product space, called the 
wedge product space, it can be shown that a state is genuinely entangled if and 
only if the state cannot be written as a wedge-product of state vectors for the 
component particles. This ensures that the connection between non-factorizability 
(in the wedge-product space) and genuine entanglement is preserved.  
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only relevant form in the present context. Only this entanglement 
supports actual, significant correlations, hence modal connections, 
between the entangled particles. Thus, we will restrict our attention to 
genuine entanglement, that is, GWM-entanglement.  
 
2.2 Relations of dependence 
Lately, philosophers of physics have turned their attention to different 
relations of ‘ontological dependence’. Among others, French ([2010], 
[2014]), Wolff ([2012]), and McKenzie ([2014]) tried in particular to 
exploit the earlier work done on the logical and metaphysical status 
of ontological dependence relations (see Fine [1995]; Correia [2008]; 
Lowe and Tahko [2015]) with a view to providing a firm basis, or a 
critical assessment, of physical structuralism in the quantum domain. 
No doubt, this is a much welcome development. Yet some subtleties 
have been neglected and an important alternative framework ignored 
altogether. 
Let us try to make some progress by taking an initial lead from 
Correia ([2008]), who distinguishes, first of all, between existential 
and essential dependence,7 and then identifies four different relations 
of essential dependence (in what follows, we use the sentential 
                                                            
7
 Essential dependence might raise some worries in the present context, for, as 
French ([2010], p. 106) puts it, ‘essentialism has not typically been viewed all that 
favourably in the context of modern physics’. Nonetheless, there is widespread 
agreement on the idea that we should indeed allow ourselves essentialist talk, 
especially because ‘essence too may be relatively innocuous [I] It may turn out, in 
fact, that what Fine has in mind by ‘essence’ is just the sort of thing that we’re used 
to dealing with all the time in particle physics’ (McKenzie [2014], p. 8). In line with 
the literature, then, we will use the essentialist framework here, without making any 
heavy commitment to essences and/or to particular views concerning their nature, 
and merely with a view to picking out the relevant features of certain (kinds of) 
objects. 
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7 
operator x□  for ‘x is essentially such that’ and E  for the ‘existence 
predicate’)8: 
 
Rigid Essential Involvement: For some R,  
 
 xRxy□   (5) 
 
(for some relation R, x is essentially related to y by R). 
 
 
Rigid Essential Necessitation:  
 
( )x Ex Ey→□  (6) 
 
(x is essentially such that it exists only if y exists). 
 
 
Generic Essential Involvement: For some R,  
 
( )x y Fy Rxy∃ ∧□  (7) 
                                                            
8
 It should be noted that one may endorse reductionism, that is, accept the bi-
conditional ( ) ( ( ))
x
x Ex xφ φ↔ →□ □ . According to reductionism, an essential 
property is just a property that something has in every possible world in which it 
exists. In other words, it is a purely modal account of essences and essential 
properties. However, well-known arguments against reductionism should be taken 
into account. Fortunately, we do not have to take a stance on this here. Note, in 
connection to this, that the existence predicate may (or may not, depending on the 
endorsement or rejection of the quantificational view of existence) be defined 
via ( )
df
Ex y x y= ∃ = . 
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(for some relation R, x is essentially related to an object that is 
F by R). 
 
 
 Generic Essential Necessitation:  
 
 ( ( ))x Ex y Fy→∃□  (8) 
 
 (x is essentially such that it exists only if something is an F). 
 
In all these cases, x is the dependent entity whereas y is the 
dependee, so that x ontologically depends on y. The thought is that 
something depends on something else if and only if the existence of 
the latter (as the very entity it is) is a necessary condition for the 
existence of the former (as the very entity it is).9 Essentialist talk 
should thus be understood in terms of the existence and distinctive 
properties of the entity or entities in question.  
                                                            
9
 A caveat is in order. Fine ([1995], p. 276) distinguishes between constitutive 
essence and consequential essence: ‘A property belongs to the constitutive 
essence of an object if it is not had in virtue of being a logical consequence of 
some more basic essential properties; and a property might be said to belong to 
the consequential essence of an object if it is a logical consequence of properties 
that belong to the constitutive essence’. This notion of consequential essence is 
intuitive but problematic. Consider the property of being either identical to or 
distinct from x. This property is part of the consequential essence of everything. 
This in turn will yield that everything depends on everything. To avoid this 
consequence Fine requires that x depends on y if and only if y cannot be 
‘generalized out’ of the consequential essence of x. In what follows, we will take for 
granted that all the interesting claims of dependence have passed this 
‘generalization’ test.  
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9 
Necessitation rather than involvement appears to be the 
preferred option in the literature. French ([2010], p. 100), for instance, 
discusses various options and ends up endorsing the following 
definition: ‘x dependsE for its existence upon y =df. It is part of the 
essence of x that x exists only if y exists’, which is basically Equation 
(6). Similarly, McKenzie ([2014]) takes Equation (6) the be the most 
general form of any dependence claim, and the most useful in the 
context of structuralism in quantum physics.10 We will follow suit. 
A qualification is required, though. It is not so much existence per 
se that is at stake, but rather the existence of something with a 
specific set of properties. While two or more entangled particles may 
well have existed without becoming entangled, it is always the case 
that as soon as such particles enter into genuine entanglement, they 
do not have independent complete sets of objective properties, and 
instead depend on one another with respect to their qualitative 
profiles.11 Or at least, this is what we will argue for. Thus, from now 
on, unless otherwise specified, we will assume that ontological 
                                                            
10
 Wolff ([2012]) uses instead the notion of identity dependence (see Tahko and 
Lowe [2015]), which is derivable from an instance of Equation (5).  
11
 Of course, what exactly ‘qualitative profile’ refers to should be specified, 
especially whether it includes all properties or only some of them. In the latter case, 
presumably the distinction between accidental and essential properties should also 
be considered. Here, however, it is sufficient to assume that the entities in question 
are mutually dependent with respect to some properties, specified on the basis of 
the relevant physics. In particular, as we will see, physical systems can be 
entangled in some degrees of freedom and not others, and only entangled degrees 
of freedom track the dependence relations we are presently interested in. Further 
details on the issue of qualitative profiles will have to wait for another occasion. 
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dependence is the relation whereby something x depends on 
something y for its existence and its properties.12 
Bearing this in mind, suitable generalizations of the previous 
schemas also need to be considered, so as to allow for different 
objects or pluralities of objects depending on different other objects 
or pluralities. The most general cases, restricting our attention to 
necessitation, are the following two: 
 
Collective Rigid Essential Necessitation: 
 
1 1( ... ... )xx n mEx Ex Ey Ey∧ ∧ → ∧ ∧□ .  (9) 
 
(x1, I, xn are essentially collectively such that they exist only if 
y1I, ym exist, where xx is a plural variable for the plurality 
containing x1, I, xn).
 13  
 
 
 Collective Generic Essential Necessitation:  
 
1( ... ( ))xx nEx Ex yy Fyy∧ ∧ →∃□ .  (10) 
                                                            
12
 In other words, the claim is one of dependence in a specific respect. Using 
the grounding terminology for just a moment, the claim is not, say, 'a grounds b', 
but rather 'the fact that a exists and possesses features P, Q, ..., S grounds the fact 
that b exists and possesses features W, X, ..., Z', where P, Q3, X, and Z stand for 
the qualitative profile of a and b.  
13
 We are assuming that a plurality xx exists if and only if all of its members x1, 
I, xn exist. Also notice that Equation (9) is normally regarded as distributive on the 
right, as equivalent to the conjunction of all statements of the form ‘It's part of the 
essence of x1, ..., xn that Ex1 & .... & Exn → Eyi’ for every i between 1 and m. 
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(x1, I, xn are essentially collectively such that they exist if 
only some Fs exist). 
  
It should be noted that collective dependence relations may carry 
significantly less information about the nature or the essence of 
individual members of the plurality in question than their singular 
counterparts. This is especially so if such dependence is genuine 
and irreducible, that is, not analysable in terms of dependence 
relations having singular entities in the dependent place. This will 
have a bearing on our later critical assessment of the relevant 
ontological alternatives. Having said this, let us now look more 
specifically at quantum systems and the sort of dependence relations 
they (may) exhibit.  
 
3 Structuralism and Holism 
There are two main candidates currently on offer for understanding 
the metaphysical nature of quantum systems, especially in the case 
of entanglement. We will refer to them as structuralism (French 
[2010]; Esfeld and Lam [2011]; Wolff [2012]; McKenzie [2014]) and 
holism (Schaffer [2010]; Schaffer [2014]; Ismael and Schaffer 
[forthcoming]), respectively.  
A structuralist understanding of quantum entanglement is 
typically but a plank in the larger programme of ontic structural 
realism (OSR). According to one of the main advocates of OSR, 
James Ladyman ([2014], p. 23), ‘Any form of structural realism based 
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on an ontological or metaphysical thesis that inflates the ontological 
priority of structure and relations’ qualifies as OSR. As a typical 
example of this, symmetric yet irreflexive physical relations are 
invoked by some philosophers in order to ensure the weak 
discernibility of quantum particles.14 And structuralists typically claim 
that these relations are fundamental, and such that the weakly 
discernible objects depend on them. For the sake of simplicity, 
consider the state described in Equation (1). In that case, the two 
particles in the singlet state are anti-correlated, meaning that upon 
measurement one necessarily obtains opposite values for their state-
dependent observables, such as spin along a particular direction. In 
terms of dependence, the hallmark of the structuralist understanding 
of these physical systems is then the following: 
  
Structuralism:  
 
{ }1 2
,
1 2 1 2,
( ( ))irr sym
xx x x
Ex Ex R Rx x= ∧ →∃□ .15  (11) 
 
Fermions 1 and 2, that is, are taken to depend on the existence of 
the irreflexive symmetric relation ‘having opposite spin to’. Crucially, 
such relation is regarded by structuralists as a physical entity that is 
                                                            
14
 Following (Saunders [2006]; Saunders and Muller [2008]; Muller and 
Seevinck [2009]). For an up-to-date critical discussion, see (Bigaj [2015]). To be 
clear, weak discernibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for entanglement, which 
is our main focus here. We are just using it as an example based on a theme that 
has been hotly debated in the recent literature and is often used as a basis for 
structuralist interpretations of the quantum domain. 
15
 This is basically what McKenzie ([2014]) ends up with.  
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13 
ontologically prior to the entangled particles16. This means that 
(entangled) quantum objects depend, or even are reducible to,17 
more fundamental physical relations.18 
The other relevant understanding of quantum entanglement is, 
as mentioned, holism (Schaffer [2010], [2014]; Ismael and Schaffer 
[forthcoming]). Focus again on the two-particle entanglement case: 
the holist claims that there is a quantum whole that has the two sub-
systems as parts, and that the sub-systems depend on such a whole, 
which is ontologically prior. The basic argument in favour of such an 
understanding is essentially the following: Neglecting particular 
interpretations of quantum mechanics,19 it is always the case that the 
state of the whole uniquely determines that of the parts, whereas the 
converse does not hold—entanglement being, of course, the 
paradigmatic counterexample. According to the holist, the best 
explanation for this is that, in an ontological sense, the whole comes 
first. Employing the formal resources that we have used so far, we 
can formulate this as the following thesis: 
 
Holism:  
                                                            
16
 Or ontologically on a par with, as contended by ‘moderate’ ontic structural 
realists; see (Esfeld and Lam [2008]). 
17
 See (Wolff [2012]) for scepticism about reduction.  
18
 More physically realistic examples are ‘having a value different from zero for 
the commutator of momentum (of one particle) and position (of another particle)’ 
or, more generally, ‘having a non-zero value for the variance of some quantity 
computed on the two particles’. The discussion of the criteria for identifying the 
‘right’ discerning relations is still ongoing, however. Having said this, the exact 
nature of discerning relations is irrelevant for our main argument. Thus, we will 
stick to ‘opposite spin’ for the sake of simplicity.  
19
 In particular, (some of) the modal interpretations, which seem to have 
somewhat different consequences; see (Calosi [2017]).  
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{ }1 2 1 2 1 2,
( ( )
xx x x
Ex Ex y x y x y= ∧ → ∃ << ∧ <<□ ),  (12) 
 
where << is the mereological notion of proper parthood.20  
 
Notice that Equation (12) does not mention properties explicitly, and 
just states that the existence of something renders the existence of 
something else necessary. However, as pointed out earlier, this can, 
and should, be understood in terms of existence plus properties, as 
the claim that something exists (in the way it does), thanks to the fact 
that something else exists (in the way it does)—where the way 
something exists corresponds to that something’s qualitative profile. 
Indeed, the basic holist argument just mentioned explicitly trades on 
qualitative profiles, insofar as it focuses on the quantum states of 
wholes and parts.21 
Importantly, while physical wholes can be ‘local’, in the quantum 
domain holism as a claim of ontological priority naturally leads to 
stronger monist views. For instance, Ismael and Schaffer 
([forthcoming]) argue that the most relevant whole comprises 
everything physical, that is, it is identical with physical reality as a 
whole. The fundamental 'one' may be identified, they suggest, either 
with the largest object existing in space and time or, alternatively, 
                                                            
20
 As per the standard definition, where parthood is taken as primitive: x is a 
proper part of y if and only if x is part of y and x is distinct from y. 
21
 Here ‘qualitative profile’ is to be understood loosely, so as to include identity 
conditions when relevant. On the notion of ‘qualitative profile’, see also Footnote 
11. 
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with the wave-function as an entity existing in 3n configuration space 
(n being the relevant number of ‘particles’ or, more broadly, 
‘components’).22 Distinguishing holism from this stronger claim is 
essential: as we will see, the shift from holism to monism is an 
unwelcome consequence of the view—while holistic elements 
broadly understood may well be, and in fact should, be part of a 
plausible interpretation of quantum entanglement. 
We will now provide a critique of both structuralism and holism 
as they have been presented in the literature. To be clear, the 
arguments put forward are not intended to be knock-down arguments 
against these positions. Rather, they are meant to highlight 
difficulties that we believe have not yet been appreciated (at least not 
fully), but are serious enough to motivate the search for an 
alternative account.  
 
4 Against Structuralism 
The problem with structuralism, we contend, is twofold: (i) it depends 
on a rather substantive and controversial reading of the quantum 
state in relational terms, and (ii) it is less informative than what one 
might expect insofar as it amounts to a claim of collective generic 
dependence.23  
                                                            
22
 It is worth pointing out that structuralism and monistic holism are not exclusive 
options. French ([2014]), for instance, takes a specific form of monism whereby the 
only existing thing is an all-encompassing structure as the best metaphysical 
framework for physical structuralism (a case of ‘existence-monism’, rather than the 
Schaffer-style ‘priority-monism’, is discussed in Section 5). 
23
 McKenzie ([2014], p. 8) is explicit in admitting this is just generic dependence.  
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Let us start with the first charge. Consider the simple singlet 
state. As mentioned, structuralists who endorse Equation (11) give a 
relational reading of the state according to which the relevant 
quantum systems depend on the irreflexive and symmetric relation of 
‘having opposite spin’. However, first, if the claim of ontological 
priority is to be upheld a non-extensional definition of the relations in 
question needs to be provided. But it appears very hard to formulate 
one (this is the basic idea, we take it, in Wolff [2012]; McKenzie 
[2014]). Second, and crucially, it is in fact by no means obvious that 
one is dealing with relations in the first place. 
Consider, for instance, entangled fermions. The Pauli exclusion 
principle states, roughly, that no two fermions in a given system can 
have exactly the same values for all quantum numbers.24 That is, two 
fermions in the same system will always have incompatible 
determinate values for at least a quantum number Q. Now, the first 
thing to notice is that if this were sufficient for concluding that there 
are two related entities in the system, then the two fermions would in 
fact be told apart from each other also by the following symmetric yet 
irreflexive relation: R* = ‘having incompatible values for quantum 
number Q’. Indeed, the relation of ‘having opposite spin’ is but an 
example of R* where Q is the spin quantum number. At any rate, 
independent of the specific properties one focuses on, the key 
question is: is R* a genuine physical relation? As a matter of fact, it 
looks as though, while relations such as this can be very easily 
                                                            
24
 Pauli ([1925]) writes that ‘there can never be two or more equivalent electrons 
in an atom, for which in strong fields the values of all quantum numbers n, l, j, and 
m are the same’.  
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17 
reconstructed from the theory at the linguistic/formal level, 
ontologically it is far from obvious that one is in fact dealing with 
actual relations, and taking this for granted essentially assumes what 
must be demonstrated. Note that this sort of consideration is different 
from the often-heard circularity charge. It does not concern the 
possibility of relations that do not presuppose, hence depend on, 
their relata (which we do not complain about); instead, it has to do 
with what we are (or are not) allowed to infer from the theory at the 
ontological level. Following, for instance, Dieks and Lubberdink 
([2011]) and Jaeger ([2010]), one may think that there are reasons 
for not connecting particle labels and individual systems in a one-to-
one fashion—the separate Hilbert spaces that enter a tensor product 
on the one hand, and putatively separate physical systems described 
by each Hilbert space on the other.25 And if there is no such direct 
connection, it becomes plausible to also think that facts such as 
those concerning fermions and the exclusion principle may not point 
to an ontology of relations and structures, and leave instead the 
metaphysical question open. 
Let us now move on to the second charge. Insofar as the 
irreflexive and symmetric relation crucially weakly discerns the two 
particle tokens in the singlet state, the structuralist might want to 
                                                            
25
 These reasons have to do, roughly, with the fact that particle labels can be 
taken to correspond to specific physical systems only in the limiting case in which 
the relevant wave-function is ‘concentrated’. But this amounts to assuming the 
classical limit, hence the very ontology of well-defined distinct objects that cannot 
be transferred to quantum mechanics without argument. 
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claim that the particles depend individually on such a relation. One 
may try to cash this out in two ways26: 
 
1
,
1 2 1 2( ( ))
irr sym
x Ex Ex R Rx x∧ → ∃□ ,  (13) 
 
1
,
1 2 1 2( ( ))
irr sym
x Ex Ex R Rx x→ ∧∃□ .  (14) 
 
Both options are problematic, though. In the first case, Equation (13), 
we would have that something about the essence of x1 and x2 ‘flows 
from the nature’ of just x1, to use Fine’s suggestive expression. In the 
second case, Equation (14), x1 would depend not just on the 
existence of a relation but also on another of its relata, namely, x2. 
Either way, this is contrary to the spirit of structuralism, which claims 
that objects depend on structures/relations, not some other 
objects/relata. To make progress, it seems, it is necessary to focus 
on collective essences instead, and emphasize the fact that a 
collective essence may not correspond to separate individual 
essences. The standard Finean example is as follows:  
 
,  (  )S ET Socrates Eiffel Tower≠□ ,   (15) 
 
 (  )S Socrates Eiffel Tower≠□ ,  (16) 
 
 (  )ET Socrates Eiffel Tower≠□ .  (17) 
                                                            
26
 The choice of x1 is entirely arbitrary; the same goes for x2. 
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The thought is that whereas it is essential to Socrates and the Eiffel 
Tower collectively that they are distinct, it is not essential to Socrates 
to be distinct from the Eiffel Tower insofar as he is not essentially 
related to the Eiffel Tower in any way. And the same goes, mutatis 
mutandis, for the Eiffel Tower.27 Thus, the structuralist is forced to 
concede that despite the fact that the physical relation in Equation 
(11) weakly discerns the individual systems, the dependence from 
such a relation is not individual dependence, but rather a collective 
one. That is, the relation in question (weakly) discerns the particles 
individually, but the latter only collectively depend on it. This may not 
be a problem in itself, especially for those structuralists who either 
eliminate objects or conceive of them as less than individuals in 
some sense (sometimes the term ‘relational’ is used). However, an 
actual difficulty emerges when it comes to the specific nature of the 
collective dependence relation in play. 
                                                            
27
 Someone who endorses reductionism as defined in Footnote 8 might claim 
that the only relevant way for Equation (15) to be true, and Equation (16) to be true 
as well is for there to be a world in which Socrates exists, but the Eiffel Tower does 
not. In this case, however, we should not say that Equation (15) is false. Rather, 
we should say that it is meaningless, insofar as the second term is an empty term. 
On this reductionist construal, far from being significantly different, Equations (13) 
and (11) would turn out to be logically equivalent. Fine’s response, we take it, 
would be that he rejects reductionism. Without necessarily following Fine on this, 
we just note here that reductionism obfuscates exactly the key difference that we 
are pointing at, namely, the difference between (a) the case in which, necessarily, 
the existence of two things has a certain consequence in virtue of the essence of 
only one of them, and (b) the case in which the same happens, but in virtue of the 
essence of the two things together. The point that there might be essential 
statements about collections that do not factor, so to speak, into essential 
statements about the individuals involved in the collection is made, to our minds 
convincingly, by Zylstra ([forthcoming]). 
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While in some cases the structuralist can claim that x1 and x2 
depend rigidly on relations such as ‘having opposite spin’, this is not 
generally the case, due to the fact that particles can be entangled in 
more than one degree of freedom. To illustrate this, let us consider a 
toy example. Consider the state described in Equation (1) once 
again. This is, to recall: 
 
1 2 1 2|  (| | | | )ψ 〉 = ↑〉 ↓〉 − ↓〉 ↑〉 . 
 
Now, define the following vectors28: 
 
1
2
1 2
1 2
1
| (| | )
2
1
| (| | )
2
1
| (| | )
2
1
| (| | )
2
x
x
x x
x x
〉 = ↑〉+ ↓〉
〉 = ↑〉− ↓〉
↑〉 = 〉+ 〉
↓〉 = 〉− 〉
 (18) 
 
Where 1| x 〉  is the state of being located at (0,0,0) and 2| x 〉  the state 
of being located at (1,0,0).29 It is easily checked that Equation (1) can 
be written as: 
 
                                                            
28
 Note that it is unphysical to define eigenstates of position as superpositions of 
spin eigenstates and vice versa. We only work with spin and position observables 
in order to make our point more perspicuous. A physically accurate example to 
make the same point would involve, for instance, spin components in different 
directions.  
29
 In a suitable frame of Cartesian coordinates.  
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1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2| ( | | | | )x x x xψ 〉 = 〉 〉 − 〉 〉 .  (19) 
 
In this toy example, systems 1 and 2 are entangled both in the spin 
and in the position-degree of freedom. In particular they stand in the 
symmetric yet irreflexive relations of ‘having opposite spin’ and ‘being 
one metre apart along the x-axis’. The crucial point is that it seems 
quite arbitrary to choose one relation over the other, hence the 
structuralist can at most make a claim of generic dependence. 
Generic dependence, however, is less stringent and informative than 
rigid dependence: is the spin correlation the ontologically basic item? 
Is it the distance relation? Is it both? Is it some third relation different 
from them? If we are correct that the dependence exhibited by 
quantum systems is necessarily generic and collective, no precise 
answer to this question can be given. From which it follows that 
structuralism is not a precise ontological thesis, in the sense that 
structuralists must take entangled relations as ontologically basic 
physical entities, but at the same time accept that these relations 
cannot be analysed any further in terms of physical observables—in 
terms of the actual properties of quantum systems. 
One might object that our argument establishes a multiplicity of 
rigid dependencies rather than a generic dependence.30 This is a 
sensible reaction. However, it is up to the structuralist to come up 
with a full-fledged proposal able to account for such a multiple 
dependence. Here, we just point out that whenever systems are 
                                                            
30
 Thanks to an anonymous referee here. 
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entangled in more than one degree of freedom, there may well be 
more than one rigid dependence relation involved on top of the 
generic one; however, the generic and the rigid relations may well 
differ both in content and adicity.31 This, we think, would detract from 
the uniformity of the account. On top of this, it would remain the case 
that faced with an undeniable proliferation of allegedly basic entities, 
structuralists would still owe us an account of which relations are 
here truly fundamental: the generic one, any of the rigid ones? All the 
rigid ones? All the rigid ones and the generic one? 
Perhaps a fully-fledged structuralist account of entangled 
systems can be provided, but for the time being it is fair to point out 
that simply claiming that ‘entanglement relations are fundamental’ is, 
contrary to what appears to be normally assumed in the literature, 
insufficient. For, entanglement is not so much a physical property of 
quantum systems, as a way for certain observables to be exemplified 
by such systems. However, in order for structuralism to be a truly 
compelling, science-based position, we need to be told what exactly 
the physical content of the relevant relations is, which observables 
the correlated quantum objects depend on. In view of this, it seems 
fair to claim that structuralism needs, to say the least, a good amount 
of further work to become a truly compelling view of the nature of 
quantum systems.32 
                                                            
31
 For example, in the case we discuss in Footnote 40, the generic relation 
would be a three-place relation, whereas the two rigid ones will be two-place 
relations.  
32
 Notice that our argument didn’t even refer to the key issue, nicely pointed out 
by (McKenzie [forthcoming]), that a structuralist reduction of all properties seems in 
fact hard to carry out, as at least some state-independent properties are left 
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5 Against Holism 
Moving now on to holism, the problem with it is analogous to that 
concerning structuralism. On the one hand, holism rests upon a 
controversial assumption about what the quantum state is supposed 
to represent. On the other hand, either (i) it sticks to a generic notion 
of dependence, thus becoming uninformative, or (ii) every attempt to 
turn the generic clam into a rigid claim of dependence will fail to 
provide a satisfactory account of some subtle features of 
entanglement.  
Starting from the first point, the holist has, in a sense, the 
opposite problem with respect to that faced by the structuralist. That 
is, she has to argue that all facts concerning the parts depend on 
facts about the whole, hence that all fundamental properties are 
monadic properties of the whole itself (be these traditional properties 
such as ‘having total spin of zero’ or more complicated properties 
such as ‘being bosonic here’ or ‘being two-fermions-one-metre-apart-
ish there’). The holist may argue (see Schaffer [2010], [2014]) that no 
matter how ‘unusual’ and/or under-determined the relevant properties 
may be, this reading of the quantum state warrants a high degree of 
uniformity, and should consequently be preferred—even at the cost 
of not attributing seemingly fundamental properties such as, say, the 
minimal amount of electric charge to what intuitively would look as 
their natural bearers, such as point-like particles.  
                                                                                                                                                           
underdetermined by the typical group-theoretic considerations invoked by 
structuralists in the quantum context. 
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In connection to this, in particular, the idea has been put 
forward (see, for example, Schaffer [2010]) that holism allows one to 
postulate the same monadic property (such as ‘being entangled’) for 
systems with different numbers of components, whereas a reading in 
terms of relations between parts forces one to admit different 
relations of different adicity for systems with different number of 
components. This argument, however, is far from uncontroversial, as 
witnessed by the objections raised in (Morganti [2009a]; Bohn [2012]; 
Calosi [2014]). For one, why think that the pluralist needs different 
relations with different fixed adicity and not a single multi-grade 
relation?  
As for the claim that all properties are monadic properties of the 
whole, it appears at odds with at least some physical facts. Consider, 
for instance, a state like that in Equation (19), and the spatial degree 
of freedom. The relational reading of such a state sounds pretty 
straightforward: it just says that quantum systems 1 and 2 stand in 
the relation of ‘being one metre apart along the x-axis’ from each 
other. On the other hand, the holist reading seems less satisfactory, 
for it should say something like ‘the whole is one metre long, and this 
is prior to the existence of two parts that are one metre apart from 
each other’, which is far from transparent.  
Consider next four particles 1,2,3,4 that can occupy only four 
positions corresponding to vectors 1 2 3 4| ,| , | ,|x x x x〉 〉 〉 〉 , such that: (i) 
1| x 〉  is the state of being located at (0,0,0), (ii) 4| x 〉  the state of being 
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located at (1,0,0); (iii) 2| x 〉 , 3| x 〉  are states of being located between 
positions 1| x 〉  and 4| x 〉 . Let the state of this four-particle system be
33: 
 
 
1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4
1 4 2 3 3 2 4 1
| | | | |
| | | |
x x x x
x x x x
ω〉 = 〉 〉 〉 〉
− 〉 〉 〉 〉
  (20) 
 
If the only thing the holist can say is that Equation (20) attributes 
‘having a one-metre extension’ to the mereological sum of 1, 2, 3, 4 
(let’s call it ‘1234’), she is losing precious information. Certainly, the 
holist might reply that she can also attribute to 1234 the properties of 
having four parts, and having parts that are related in a certain way 
(for example, excluding that 1 and 4 are ever in between 2 and 3). 
But since she is forced to mention particular relations between 
specific parts, and all the available information about 1234 can be 
given in terms of these, she owes us an account of why these 
relations and parts are not enough at the ontological level.34  
Moving now on to the kind of dependence that is called into 
play, things might seem brighter in this respect for the holist than for 
the structuralist. For, there seem to be natural candidates for 
formulating a rigid dependence claim. Consider the following: 
 
Holism*:  
                                                            
33
 We are neglecting anti-symmetrization for simplicity.  
34
 Notice, in particular, that once relations are also taken into account the idea 
that the whole contains more information than its parts becomes less compelling, 
at least on a mereological understanding of properties and relations. This is exactly 
the reason why structuralists account for the ‘emergent’ nature of quantum 
entanglement in terms of entangled particles plus irreducible correlations. 
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{ }1 2 1 2 1 2,
( ( ))
xx x x
Ex Ex E x x= ∧ → +□   (21) 
 
where + stands for mereological sum.  
 
Under any extensional mereology, x1 + x2 is unique, so that Equation 
(21) is a truly rigid claim of dependence, pointing to the specific 
composite system that is, crucially, the only relevant whole in the 
case at hand. Despite its attractiveness, however, this understanding 
of the situation faces a number of problems. 
First, entanglement, via modal connections, tracks dependence 
not composition. In fact, there are (i) cases in which we have 
entangled degrees of freedom within a single particle, and (ii) cases 
in which non-classical correlations emerge in decomposable 
systems, systems that may just be regarded as collections of 
independent, simpler systems (this is known as ‘quantum discord’).35 
Thus, the connection between entanglement and composition is far 
from straightforward. As a matter of fact, that there is always a 
(uniquely defined) mereological sum in cases like Equation (21), and 
everything significant there is to say about quantum entanglement is 
always in terms of (uniquely defined) mereological wholes are 
instead very substantial claims, definitely in need of further support.36  
                                                            
35
 See (Hasegawa [2012]) on point (i), and (Earman [2015]; Li and Luo [2008]) 
on (ii).  
36
 One may opt for a non-mereological understanding of the relevant wholes, for 
instance endorsing realism about the wave-function in configuration space and 
noticing the obvious fact that actual physical systems are in no way parts of the 
wave-function. However, this does not mitigate the problem, as the holist now 
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A possible reply on behalf of the holist is that a suitably 
powerful mereology does the job. Schaffer, for instance, explicitly 
endorses unrestricted composition, which obviously guarantees that 
one can always identify a mereological whole corresponding to the 
relevant quantum state, even independently of the number of 
components and whether or not entanglement occurs. On the other 
hand, this is again a claim that has been contested in the literature. 
Caulton ([2015]), for instance, argues that fermionic composition 
provides counter-examples to the unrestricted composition axiom.37 
Even granting that mereology is applicable in the quantum 
domain so as to support holism, there is another problem with 
Equation (21). To illustrate it, we need to introduce the distinction 
between maximally, or completely, entangled and non-maximally 
entangled states (see, among others, Horodecki et al. [2009], pp. 
889–90; Ghirardi et al. [2002], p. 68). Let us say that a n-partite state 
is completely unentangled if and only if each component system 1, 
I, n has its own pure state. A state is GMW-entangled—that is, in 
our earlier terminology, ‘genuinely’ entangled—if it is not completely 
unentangled. A GWM-entangled state is completely, or maximally, 
entangled if and only if the only system that is not decomposable in a 
non-entangled state is the total system 12 I n. Equivalently, only the 
total system can be assigned a pure state. Note now that there might 
                                                                                                                                                           
owes us a story concerning the connection between the whole in configuration 
space and the local objects, properties and facts that we experience—which is, of 
course, a well-known issue for wave-function realists. 
37
 More precisely, Caulton provides counterexamples also to finite-binary 
arbitrary fusions. Needless to say, this is problematic for the holist. Healey ([2013]) 
also questions the application of traditional notions of composition in contemporary 
physics. 
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be GMW-entangled systems that are not maximally entangled, 
whose states are of the form: 
 
1... 1... ...| | |n i i i nψ ψ ψ +〉 = 〉 ⊗ 〉 .  (22) 
 
In the two-particle case the distinction between general (GMW)-
entanglement and maximal entanglement collapses. Yet this is not 
normally the case, for we might find states such as 
 
1234 1 2 1 2 3 4 3 4| | | | | | | | |ψ 〉 =↑〉 ↓〉 − ↓〉 ↑〉 ⊗ ↑〉 ↓〉 − ↓〉 ↑〉 ,  (23) 
 
which are entangled insofar as 
1234 1 2 3 4| | | | |ψ ψ ψ ψ ψ〉 ≠ 〉 ⊗ 〉 ⊗ 〉 ⊗ 〉  but 
are not maximally or completely entangled because 
1234 12 34| | |ψ ψ ψ〉 = 〉 ⊗ 〉 . 
Now, consider a maximally entangled four-particle system. There 
seems to be a clear sense in which the truly fundamental whole is 
1234, for the state of each part of 1234, 12 included, will be fixed 
only by 1234. This is exactly the kind of argument the holist put 
forward in the first place. However, this seems to run afoul of 
Equation (21), for Equation (21) entails that 1 depends rigidly on 12, 
not on 1234. Of course, the holist could stick to the claim that what is 
truly fundamental is 1234—for instance, in virtue of the transitivity of 
ontological dependence. Consequently, the holist might argue that (i) 
the rigid dependence of each part on the ‘minimal’ whole—the whole 
that comprises those parts and nothing else—‘counts less’ than (ii) its 
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rigid dependence on the ‘larger’ whole, which is the truly fundamental 
entity. But what would be the ground for this, that is, for determining 
'true fundamentality', exactly? Of course, the holist cannot just 
assume the truth of his/her Parmenidean view of reality. If the 
criterion we are looking for is based on physical facts plus rigid 
dependence, we have (at least) two options to choose from, and only 
one of them can be kosher for the holist. Yet, the choice seems to be 
entirely underdetermined. 
Further empirical evidence can be invoked that pulls in the 
same direction. Recently, it has been shown that it is possible to take 
a n-particle system in which all particles are only partly entangled 
and concentrate entanglement into a smaller number of maximally 
entangled parts, leaving the others unentangled (Bennett et al. 
[2006]). This process is called entanglement distillation.38 
Conversely, one can spread entanglement over a large number of 
particles so that the initial total entanglement is preserved, and yet 
the particles are only partially entangled. This process is known as 
entanglement dilution.  
The problem for the holist is that in these cases it appears natural 
to say that dependence relations hold just between the parts that are 
entangled (and their fusion, if there is such a thing), and there are no 
modal connections between the parts that, say, are left unentangled 
by the distillation process. Yet, physically, one still has a n-particle 
                                                            
38
 Or entanglement concentration, or entanglement purification.  
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whole after the process.39, 40 Suppose, however, that the holist insists 
on ‘going large’, and consequently suggests the following refinement 
of the view: 
 
Holism**:  
 
{ }1 1 1,...,
( ... ( ( ... ) ( )))
n
n nxx x x
Ex Ex Ey x y x y z y z= ∧ ∧ → << ∧ ∧ << ∧ ∃ <<□  
 (24) 
 
Whereas Equation (21) says that the parts depend on the minimal 
whole, Equation (24) says that they depend on a maximal whole (a 
whole that has them as parts and is not part of anything else). 
Besides the fact that this move seems to be made for entirely a priori 
reasons, the problem with this is that the only way to turn Equation 
                                                            
39
 The connection should be clear: entanglement distillation basically turns non-
maximally entangled n-particles states into maximally entangled m < n-particle 
states; see (Wang et al. [2012]).  
40
 Here is another interesting argument based on an example, which we borrow 
from (Bigaj [2012]) with only a slight change of notation (we are grateful to an 
anonymous referee for the pointer). Consider a three-particle system 123, whose 
component parts, 1, 2, and 3 are associated with four-dimensional Hilbert spaces 
spanned by vectors |+>, |->, |*>, and |#>. The state of 123 is |Ψ>123 = |+>1|->2|*>3 + 
|+>1|#>2|+>3 + |->1|+>2|*>3 + |->1|*>2|+>3. It is possible to prove that this state is 
maximally entangled and yet the state of 13 is a product state. This suggests that 
system 1 is entangled with system 2, system 2 is entangled with system 3, but 
system 1 is not entangled with system 3. Bigaj suggests an interesting physical 
interpretation. Let |+> = |x1>|↑ >; |-> = |x1>|↓>; |*> = |x2>|↑>, and |#> = |x2>|↓>, 
where |x1> and |x2> represent the only two possible locations of the particles. Then 
1 is entangled with 2 in the spin degree of freedom, whereas particle 2 is entangled 
with 3 in the position degree of freedom. What is the most plausible holist 
interpretation of such a state? According to the holist the most fundamental 
physical system is 123. But this analysis clearly misses precious quantum 
information about correlations between the parts of the whole system. It looks as 
though 123 has two parts (1 and 2) that exhibit spin-correlation supporting certain 
modal connections, and two parts (parts 2 and 3) that exhibit position correlations 
supporting other modal connections. This straightforward analysis, however, is 
simply not available to the holist.  
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(24) into a claim that delivers rigidity in all cases is to look at the only 
whole that is not a proper part of anything, namely, the 
mereologically maximal element, the universe.  
In other words, holism** collapses into monism, the view that 
there is only one fundamental entity, and each part depends on that 
fundamental entity.41 As mentioned, some holists are indeed monists. 
However, one might want to endorse holism and yet deny the 
stronger monist view. Indeed, the holist intuition we are discussing 
here concerns the peculiar features of specific quantum systems, 
while monism as a general metaphysical thesis clearly depends upon 
important additional considerations. As a matter of fact, there are 
reasons for thinking that some interpretations of quantum mechanics 
are simply not amenable to a monistic rendering.42 
Having said this, let us now assume that both structuralism and 
holism are not entirely satisfactory as ontological accounts of 
quantum composite systems, and turn to the question whether there 
is a better alternative.43 
                                                            
41
 It collapses in fact in a particular kind of monism, namely, Schaffer’s version 
of priority monism, where the only fundamental entity and the less fundamental 
ones are mereologically related; see (Ismael and Schaffer [forthcoming]). 
42
 In particular, the monist who attempts to ground his/her view on quantum 
theory has to defend the claim that entanglement is a pervasive feature of the 
universe. But this claim is questionable. Schaffer himself, moreover, notes that 
monism is in immediate tension with some interpretations of quantum mechanics, 
such as Rovelli’s relational interpretation. For a detailed assessment of monism in 
the quantum realm, see (Calosi [forthcoming]). It could be argued that the case for 
monism based on entanglement finds a better basis in quantum field theory. 
However, just how global and persistent entanglement is in the quantum-field-
theoretic context is in fact open to debate. And, in any event, following the literature 
here we are discussing non-relativistic quantum mechanics only. 
43
 One may claim that the problems for the holist are worse than those 
encountered by the structuralist, as the former cannot accommodate some kinds of 
entanglement, while the latter is ‘just’ forced to postulate generic notions of 
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6 Coherentism 
6.1 Coherentism: The account 
Do structuralism and holism exhaust the metaphysical possibilities 
when it comes to accounting for the relations of dependence 
exhibited by entangled systems? Looking at the relevant literature, 
one might think that they do. However, we want to argue that there is 
another option: ‘coherentism’. 
Roughly, according to coherentism the right conclusion to draw 
from the empirical evidence involving quantum entangled systems is 
neither (i) that physical relations are prior to physical objects, nor (ii) 
that objects depend upon a more fundamental whole of which they 
are a part. Rather, what we should say is that objects may be 
regarded as fundamental, provided that an essential part of their 
being what they are is not taken to derive from ‘lower’ or ‘upper’ more 
fundamental levels in a hierarchy, and is instead conjectured to stem, 
so to put it, from ‘horizontal’, same-level structures of mutual 
relations of ontological dependence. In this context, coherentism 
takes from structuralism the emphasis on symmetric relations, and 
from holism the emphasis on ‘global’ ontological dependence 
between more or less traditional objects. The resulting idea is that 
the relevant physical facts are to be interpreted in terms of symmetric 
                                                                                                                                                           
dependence. While we are happy to concede this, we note that, on the other hand, 
structuralism is more revisionary, in that it makes relations more fundamental than 
relata (or at least equally fundamental). Furthermore, as we pointed out, both 
positions need independent arguments in favour of their preferred reading of the 
quantum state. Based on this, one may still claim that, all things considered, holism 
and structuralism are equally unsatisfactory. Thanks to an anonymous referee for 
pressing this point. 
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relations of ontological dependence between certain groups of non-
relational entities. 
To illustrate our proposal, it is useful to start from the 
structuralist insight that entangled particles are essentially related in 
some (generic) way. For present purposes, let us capture this via the 
following claim of necessary involvement: 
 
{ }1 2 1 2,xx x x
Rx x=□   (25) 
 
According to Equation (25), if two entangled entities exist, then there 
is a relation holding between them.  
Now, as we have seen, structuralists take the relation to be 
physical, and to be a fundamental ontological item. Accordingly, they 
claim either that the two entities x1 and x2 are mere ‘epiphenomena’, 
since they are reducible to the relation; or, on a milder reading, that 
the relation necessitates the existence of two ‘placeholders’ with the 
specific features determined by the relation itself. In fact, 
structuralists claim that the physical relation plays a double role: on 
the one hand, it relates x1 and x2, as per Equation (25); on the other, 
it is one of the relata of the dependence relation tracked (in the 
present case) by entanglement, the other relatum being the ‘plurality 
of’ x1 and x2. This is exactly where structuralists and coherentists part 
ways. To appreciate this departure, consider the following revealing 
passage from Fine ([1995], pp. 282–4):  
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It is sometimes thought that there are objects whose 
nature can be understood in terms of one another [I] in 
addition to possessing constitutive essential properties 
they will also enter into constitutive essential relations. Let 
us therefore say that an essential relationship between 
two or more objects is irreducible if it is not a logical 
consequence of the essential properties of the objects 
considered separately or of the essential relationships 
among disjoint proper subsets of the objects. Two objects 
may then be taken to be reciprocally dependent, under the 
present consequentialist conception, just in case they 
stand in an irreducible essential relationship, either 
together or in partnership with other objects. 
 
What the coherentist does is maintain that in the entanglement case, 
the relevant physical systems exhibit essential collective features in 
Fine's sense. 
This is crucial, as this sort of essentiality entails that the relevant 
facts about the particles considered together are irreducible, that is, 
they are neither a logical consequence of, nor do they supervene on, 
any disjoint proper subset of properties of the relata. In quantum 
jargon, this means that the probability distribution of the relevant 
degrees of freedom captured by R does not factorize. This ensures 
that the coherentist analysis applies to cases of genuine 
entanglement, that is, to GMW-entanglement as defined in Section 
2.44  
                                                            
44
 As a matter fact, it applies non-trivially only to those cases. For, in the case of 
non-GMW entanglement, the probability distribution factorizes. Thus, the relevant 
facts do not qualify as essential to the components of the system considered 
together. 
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 Once the essentiality of the interconnection between the 
subsystems is recognized as a crucial aspect, the coherentist insists 
that this should not be interpreted in terms of some physical relation 
being more fundamental than its relata, but rather in terms of the two 
relata being mutually dependent, as Fine himself suggests. That is,  
 
1 21 2 2 1
( )  ( )x xEx Ex Ex Ex→ ∧ →□ □ .  (26) 
 
Indeed, we take Equation (26) to be the core of metaphysical 
coherentism. It is, to repeat, the claim that entangled particles are 
mutually ontologically dependent—this being understood in the 
sense that physical objects are fundamental and at the same time 
constitutively dependent on each other. Note that this is not to say 
that the two particles are mutually dependent in general, as they may 
well exist unentangled. The claim is that once they interact in certain 
ways, they become symmetrically dependent on one another. 
It is important to stress (again) that the relation of ontological 
dependence at stake here is one whereby the existence and 
qualitative profile of one entity depends on the existence and 
qualitative profile of the other and vice versa. This is crucial because, 
as we explained, a simple conditional statement to the effect that if x 
exists so does y would be rather uninteresting and would not capture 
the essential features of entangled systems, especially in cases of 
GMW-entanglement. For, genuine entanglement primarily concerns 
the states of physical systems, hence their properties. Fortunately, it 
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is by no means necessary to understand Equation (26) as a simple 
conditional involving existence. To the contrary, as pointed out 
earlier, we take expressions such as ‘x1’ and ‘x2’ to refer to two things 
that exist with certain properties. So understood, we contend, the 
essentiality of the necessary-involvement relation in Equation (25), 
and the mutual dependence relation in Equation (26) ground, and 
explain, the typical phenomena related to genuine entanglement, 
such as non-factorizability of states, non-local correlations etc.  
Acknowledging the possibility and actuality of 'partnership 
connections', coherentism allows for 'horizontal webs' (or 'loops', or 
'chains', or whatever conveys the idea that there are no vertical 
pyramids of any sort) of dependence, such as: 
 
( )  ( )  ( )
i kx i j x j j k x k i
Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex→ ∧ → ∧ →□ □ □ .  (27)
  
It should be clear by now that contrary to what one may think, this is 
not explanatorily deficient: we are not just saying ‘a depends on b 
and b depends on a’, but rather something like ‘a, b, c,In’ and their 
properties collectively ground the whole or plurality P with such and 
such properties (the entangled system), and the latter makes it 
possible for a, b, c,I, n to exist and/or to exemplify certain 
properties/relations’. In this sense, the relevant analogy here is with 
the ‘sophisticated’, or ‘holistic’ sort of coherentism about justification 
in epistemology: there, the claim is not that there is a linear 
dependence between entities (beliefs) so that, in the end, a belief 
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justifies itself; rather, beliefs partially support each other by 
constituting a belief system that by virtue of having certain features, 
makes the constituting beliefs justified. In the words of BonJour 
([1988], pp. 91–2), for instance: 
  
It is at the local level of justification that inferential 
justification appears linear [I] However [I] a coherence 
theory will claim, the apparent circle of justification is not in 
fact vicious because it is not genuinely a circle: the 
justification of a particular empirical belief finally depends, 
not on other particular beliefs as the linear conception of 
justification would have it, but instead on the overall 
system and its coherence. 
 
This also makes the distance from structuralism quite clear. 
Compare, for instance, with what Wolff ([2012], p. 610) says when 
contrasting physical structuralism with a particular version of 
mathematical structuralism: 
 
(ODO) states a certain kind of holism: individual 
mathematical objects depend on all the other objects in 
their domain. This is in contrast to claims about ordinary 
objects, which we take to be largely independent of other 
ordinary objects [I] (ODO) by itself isn’t a form of 
structuralism. (ODO) does not claim any priority of 
structure over objects, it asserts an interdependence of 
certain kinds of objects. 
 
ODO is the claim that each object in the domain D of some 
mathematical structure depends on every other object in D (Linnebo 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/bjps/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/bjps/axy064/5096934 by  claudio.calosi@
unige.ch on 15 Septem
ber 2018
Calosi and Morganti 
 
[2008]). Something like this is, essentially, what we have in mind 
here. 
It is easy to see that the view being put forward is not a holist 
view either. For, arguably, coherentism per se is compatible with the 
idea that in some cases, there is no whole to begin with (which is 
already relevant in view of the close connection between holism and 
monism highlighted earlier). Indeed, even though the mutual 
interdependence of objects is naturally expressed in terms of wholes 
being 'richer' than their separate parts, strictly speaking on a 
coherentist construal no whole needs to be posited as ontologically 
prior to its parts.45 Indeed, no whole needs to be posited at all in 
addition to the plurality of mutually related entities!46  
The difference between coherentism on the one hand and 
structuralism and holism on the other can also be expressed in the 
following way: It may look as though coherentism has to start from 
some sort of structuralist reading of the quantum state, in that it 
claims that entangled parts are essentially related. However, we 
could start from a holist reading as well, and say that there is a 
monadic property that is instantiated by the alleged mereological 
fusion of the entangled particles, and that property necessitates a 
                                                            
45
 It is worth pointing out that while in an obvious sense a set of mutually 
dependent entities makes up a whole, different stories can be told concerning how 
wholes are determined, and the connection between the physical and the 
metaphysical aspect of composition. One may want to insist, for instance, that a 
physical composition process has indeed taken place whenever symmetric 
dependence relations are instantiated, and that the former is responsible for the 
existence of the latter. While we are sympathetic to this view, this is an additional 
claim.  
46
 Of course, this depends on one's answer to the special composition question, 
and perhaps on one's opinion on composition as identity. But we do not need to get 
into details here. 
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relation between the particles. For instance, in the simple case of the 
singlet state, it could be said that the monadic property ‘having total 
spin = 0’ necessitates the relation ‘having opposite spin’ holding 
between individual subsystems. Alternatively, one may start from a 
pluralist ontology of individual physical systems and add irreducible 
physical relations (as per Teller’s ‘relational holism’; see Teller 
[1986]; Morganti [2009b]). This sort of ‘indifference’—far from 
constituting a problem—indicates that coherentism constitutes a sui 
generis ontological view, genuinely different from extant alternatives. 
Any of these choices will do for the coherentist, because for her each 
of them is simply a particular way to get to what is really 
fundamental, symmetric dependence relations that set constraints, 
as it were, on their relata and their properties—the latter being, 
importantly, the only physical entities that have to be posited in the 
ontological inventory. 
One last remark is in order. Given that structuralists and holists 
emphasise vertical dependence relations while coherentism focuses 
on horizontal ‘webs’ of mutual dependence, one could maintain that 
there is room for views that combine coherentism with either holism 
or structuralism or even both. While we have nothing to object to this, 
we note that: (i) given that these mixed views would entail greater 
complexity, it should be shown that they are required, or at any rate 
recommended, for explanatory purposes, for instance, because there 
is some specific explanatory work that coherentism cannot do, or 
does worse than structuralism and/or holism. If anything, we 
suggested in this article that this is not the case; (ii) at any rate, even 
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if a mixed view turned out to be necessary (see remarks in next 
section), it seems coherentism would be part of it, which is already 
sufficient for our present purposes. 
 
6.2 Coherentism: The best of both worlds? 
We argued that coherentism strikes a nice balance between 
structuralism and holism: it incorporates insights from both, while 
steering clear of some controversial assumptions these two views 
need to make. In so doing, we think, coherentism gives us a picture 
of reality, from which several explanatory stories can be extracted, 
possibly going beyond the case of entanglement. Let us now look at 
this in more detail. 
Since the present article is primarily concerned with the 
philosophical analysis of entanglement, one may first of all ask at this 
point for a detailed treatment of the specific difficulties that arise in 
the philosophy of physics when entangled systems are concerned. 
This primarily boils down, of course, to providing a detailed account 
of quantum correlations as they emerge in EPR-like settings, and of 
the well-known violations of Bell-type inequalities. Concerning this, to 
avoid misunderstanding, we first point out explicitly that our proposal 
is a squarely metaphysical one. As such, it cannot be expected to 
provide a solution to the problem represented by the empirically 
observed violations of Bell’s inequalities, but rather to suggest a 
specific philosophical gloss on it—a gloss that, we claim, should be 
preferred over other metaphysical alternatives for the reasons 
considered in the article, having to do with explanatory power at a 
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more general level. Indeed, whatever choices there may be available 
for dealing with the problems related to Bell’s theorem, it is 
reasonable to expect that they are equally accessible to coherentists, 
structuralists and holists. Having said this, at any rate, here’s a 
suggestion for analysing correlations violating Bell inequalities in 
coherentist terms. 
First of all, it may be useful to recall the basic structure of Bell-
type arguments, which is the following: assuming that (i) 
measurements determine sharp values for the measured 
observables, (ii) values of the relevant spin-projections for the 
particles just before measurement are related to the initial state of the 
particles (when the entangled system is prepared), (iii) the 
successive outcomes of repeated identical measurements, in 
particular of the type to be performed on one of two entangled 
particles, are always genuinely random, (iv) any measurement result 
directly corresponds to an actually possessed property, and (v) 
locality holds, so that the outcomes of space-like related 
measurements must be independent, then certain inequalities follow 
that can be shown to be violated by at least some quantum 
composite systems (both at the abstract level of the theory’s 
formalism and experimentally), that is, by genuinely entangled 
systems. Not surprisingly, coherentists can suggest that (v) has to 
go, and in particular that factorizability fails, and measurements on 
space-like related entangled particles are not independent, due to a 
failure of what is known as outcome independence. That is, for any 
two genuinely entangled and space-like related particles 1 and 2, 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/bjps/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/bjps/axy064/5096934 by  claudio.calosi@
unige.ch on 15 Septem
ber 2018
Calosi and Morganti 
 
measurement results x and y, respectively, apparatus settings i and j, 
respectively, and any eventual set of hidden variables H, it is not the 
case that P1(x | i, j, y, H) = P1(x | i, j, H) and P2(y | i, j, x, H) = P2(y | i, 
j, H).47 And the reason for this is that the qualitative profiles of the 
particles 1 and 2 are symmetrically dependent, hence the fact that 
outcome x obtained at the 1-wing determines the outcome at the 2-
wing—which will be a y-outcome due to the system’s initial state, the 
observed x-outcome and the relevant laws of nature. Again, we do 
not claim that this story is a particularly new one, or one that is only 
available to the coherentist. We note, however, the following: First of 
all, the existence of a symmetric dependence relation does provide 
(at least, of course, for those non-sceptical towards talk of ontological 
dependence) a non-causal explanation of the correlation in question. 
Compare this, for instance, with the causal analysis in (Ismael and 
Schaffer [forthcoming]): what we are suggesting is that by endorsing 
coherentism, one might invoke a failure of locality—in their 
terminology—that does not feature any causal component, contrary 
to what they claim. The same goes, it seems, when coherentism is 
contrasted with other putative explanations based on ‘common 
causes’. Moreover, we note that the structuralist claim that 
entanglement is a genuine physical relation is tricky here: for, either 
this is taken literally, but then it seems in fact hard to provide an 
explanation, since presumably this type of relation must obey the 
usual constraints of finite-speed propagation of causal signals and, 
consequently, locality; alternatively, talk of entanglement being a 
                                                            
47
 Where P(x | y) stands, as usual, for the conditional probability of x given y. 
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physical relation is not taken literally, but then we don’t see any other 
way of understanding this if not in coherentist terms. As for holism, 
something similar holds: for, presumably, the holist will say that the 
non-local correlation is explained in terms of facts about the two-
particle whole—say, total spin of zero plus the Pauli exclusion 
principle holding for its two components; but then again, either a 
story in terms of a physical link among the components is told, in 
which case these problems arise again, or one says that the whole is 
prior to the parts and the latter are therefore mutually ontologically 
related with respect to their qualitative profiles, in which case what 
really does the explaining here is just the coherentist claim of 
symmetric dependence. 
Continuing now our comparative assessment, coherentism easily 
handles the cases we discussed in this article. For instance, in the 
case of entanglement distillation, the coherentist will simply say that 
dependence relations are confined—so to speak—to some proper 
parts of the composite system (if there is any), or between some 
members of the plurality of those parts (if there is no mereological 
fusion of those members), whereas they spread over all of its parts in 
the case of entanglement dilution. As for the difference between 
completely and non-completely entangled systems, consider the non-
completely entangled state in Equation (23). The coherentist 
account48 will yield that there are symmetric relations of dependence 
between 1 and 2 on the one hand and 3 and 4 on the other, and no 
other significant dependence relation, which is exactly what we were 
                                                            
48
 We are restricting coherentism to the core claim in Equation (26) here.  
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after. In the case of a n-particle completely entangled case, instead, 
it will deliver the following: 
 
( )  ( )
i jx i j x j i
Ex Ex Ex Ex→ ∧ →□ □  (28) 
 
for each xi,j among the xx ={x1,I,xn} with i ≠ j. A similar story can be 
told, more generally, in all the cases in-between maximal, complete 
entanglement and complete non-entanglement (including the three-
particle case discussed in Footnote 40). In each of these cases, the 
coherentist will postulate mutual dependence relations holding only 
among those systems that are effectively entangled and, 
consequently, are not in states that attribute a complete, objective set 
of properties to them independently of the surrounding environment.  
Generalizing from the case of entanglement, other issues a 
coherentist framework might shed light on include composition and 
Humean supervenience (see Calosi and Morganti [2016]), and 
structuralism in physics and ontic structural realism, including 
considerations having to do with particle-types and the role of group 
theory in quantum mechanics (see Morganti [unpublished]).  
To the foregoing considerations related to explanatory power, 
one may wish to add ‘a conservativeness argument’, to the point that 
the account allows one to: (i) build an ontology of ‘traditional’ objects; 
and (ii) claim that objects can be mutually dependent when it comes 
to their qualitative profile, but also retain the traditional bottom-up 
dependence structure when it comes to mereological structure. 
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Having now made our case for coherentism, let us consider 
some potential problems before closing. One objection is that 
coherentism not only allows for, but actually requires symmetric and 
cyclic relations of dependence, but this goes against the widely held 
assumption (see Lowe [2006]; Schaffer [2010]) that genuine 
metaphysical explanations must be based on asymmetric relations, 
otherwise a vicious circularity arises between explananda and 
explanantia. Is this a real problem? First of all, let us note that 
structuralists too maintain that neglecting symmetric relations of 
dependence might simply be due to a bias in favour of foundationalist 
metaphysical accounts, in particular mereological atomism. For 
example, here is McKenzie ([2014], p. 3; see also French [2010], pp. 
102–3):  
 
I appreciate that it is awkward to speak of reciprocated or 
‘symmetric’ priority when the word ‘priority’ connotes 
asymmetry. The use of this term may be put down to a 
widespread bias against symmetric dependence 
relations—a bias I reject. 
 
As a matter of fact, non-standard, non-foundationalist, and non-
atomistic models of metaphysical structure are receiving increasing 
attention lately (see, for instance, some of the essays in Bliss and 
Priest [forthcoming]), so this cannot be a decisive argument against 
the account being put forward here. 
Indeed, it seems obvious to us that general metaphysical 
theses should be sensitive to empirical input, and to an open-minded 
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approach to the interpretation of science. Thus, if it emerges that 
non-hierarchical metaphysical structures manage, all things 
considered, to provide a satisfactory philosophical explanation of a 
certain domain of reality, it would appear simply wrong to discard 
them on the basis that a priori it is assumed that the relevant 
philosophical notions must have certain formal features, and reality 
has to follow suit. Our proposal here is exactly that one should not be 
misled and generalize intuitions that may hold (or at least appear 
very plausible) in the more limited domain of mereological relations—
and perhaps only at the level of common sense and middle-sized dry 
goods. Indeed, in the case of quantum mechanical systems it might, 
all things considered, be best to think of them as characterized by 
‘horizontal’ networks of dependence, different in important respects 
from both classical mereological structures and more revisionary 
ontological accounts currently on offer—which all obey the customary 
hierarchical view of reality.49  
Lastly, there might be a worry about informativeness. The 
thought being that, exactly like structuralism, coherentism is in fact 
unable to deliver rigid claims of dependence. Consider two entangled 
particles x1 and x2. Isn't a generic claim to the point that particle x1 
depends on there being some particle that has a particular qualitative 
                                                            
49
 Besides quantum entanglement and the other scenarios mentioned in the 
course of the article, physics suggests other places where a metaphysical 
coherentist might want to look. Consider the law of quantum chromodynamics 
according to which there are no coloured particles, so that quarks necessarily 
come in groups of three. Doesn’t this suggest that these particles are mutually 
existentially dependent? And of course one may want to explore the applicability of 
coherentism beyond physics. 
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profile and stands in the appropriate relation to x1 (and vice versa), 
all that we have?  
While we think that generic dependence may have some role to 
play, we think the answer to this question is negative. Coherentism 
starts off recognizing that there is an essential relation between the 
entangled particles. It is true that the relation in question might have 
been a different one—that is, particles could have been entangled in 
another degree of freedom. It is also true that particle x1 might have 
been entangled with particle x3, rather than x2. More generally, it is 
true that when one considers entanglement as characterizing a 
certain kind, class, family, or type of physical systems, all one can 
have is indeed generic dependence. Yet according to coherentism, 
once the relation R is specified—that is, in concrete cases in which x1 
is entangled with x2—x1’s qualitative profile with respect to the 
specific degree of freedom relevant for the case at hand depends 
precisely, or rigidly, on x2 and not some other particle (and vice 
versa). Note that this is true even if the two particles are entangled in 
more than one degree of freedom. Crucially, for the coherentist it is 
always specific entangled system-tokens that come first, in the order 
of explanation and at the metaphysical level. That is, while 
structuralists cannot go beyond generic dependence, coherentists 
obtain generic dependence, as it were, as a more or less obvious 'by-
product' of actual relations holding among specific objects, hence 
able to ground rigid dependencies. Given the widespread agreement, 
discussed earlier in the article, to the point that rigid claims are more 
informative, we thus conclude that coherentism provides an 
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/bjps/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/bjps/axy064/5096934 by  claudio.calosi@
unige.ch on 15 Septem
ber 2018
Calosi and Morganti 
 
informative explanation of what it is at stake in cases of 
entanglement.  
 
7 Conclusion 
In this article, we presented a novel ontological account of entangled 
quantum systems, based on symmetric dependence relations 
between objects. We are confident that the account can (and should 
be) generalized. While the basic features of the view should, 
hopefully, be already clear, further work is of course required in order 
to make it complete and as explanatory as have suggested it can be. 
In the end, those made here were only the first steps towards 
coherentist quantum mechanics.  
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